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Article

Will LGBT Antidiscrimination Law Follow
the Course of Race Antidiscrimination
Law?
Robert S. Chang

†

INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 2015, the United States Supreme Court in
Obergefell v. Hodges made marriage equality the law of the
1
land. In this ruling, the Court burnished its reputation as an
2
institution that safeguards civil rights for all. Consider the
Court’s opening line in Obergefell: “The Constitution promises
liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes certain
specific rights that allows persons, within a lawful realm, to de3
fine and express their identity.” In closing, the Court says of
the petitioners who sought marriage equality: “They ask for
equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants
4
them that right.” The Court also makes clear that the Constitution is not self-executing and that the Court is the ultimate
arbiter that safeguards the civil rights guaranteed by the Constitution, even, and perhaps especially, when the democratic
5
process would say otherwise.
† Professor of Law and Executive Director, Fred T. Korematsu Center
for Law and Equality, Seattle University School of Law. I’d like to thank Rajin
Olson of the Minnesota Law Review for inviting me to participate in the Law
Review’s Centennial Symposium. I’d also like to thank the participants in Seattle University School of Law’s Summer Workshop Series for comments on an
earlier draft. Copyright © 2016 by Robert S. Chang.
1. See 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015).
2. See, e.g., David H. Gans, A Term to Remember, NEW REPUBLIC (June
28, 2015), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/122191/supreme-court-term
-remember (“Defying the view that it’s entirely hostile to civil rights, the Court
ruled [this term] time and again for the protection of equality.”).
3. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593.
4. Id. at 2608.
5. Id. at 2605 (discussing the importance of the democratic process but
noting that “when the rights of persons are violated, ‘the Constitution requires
redress by the courts,’ notwithstanding the more general value of democratic
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While some were celebrating the outcome, others wondered
6
what would come next. Would there be acquiescence or resistance to the ruling? In a short span of time, we saw the images of same-sex couples celebrating their legal marriages juxtaposed against Texas Governor Greg Abbott and Louisiana
Governor Bobby Jindal vowing to fight the Supreme Court rul7
ing; Chief Justice Roy Moore of the Alabama Supreme Court
directing local officials to deny marriage licenses to same-sex
8
couples; a Kentucky clerk refusing to issue any marriage li9
censes to any couples, gay or straight; and vendors refusing to
10
provide services for same-sex weddings. Were these defiant
acts the harbinger of massive resistance hearkening back to the
11
aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I) that
12
backlash prognosticators predicted? Backlash prognosticators

decisionmaking” (quoting Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1637 (2014))).
6. See, e.g., Symposium, After Marriage, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 479
(2015); Robert P. Jones, After Same-Sex Marriage, Then What?, ATLANTIC
(June 24, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/after
-same-sex-marriage-then-what/396659.
7. Nicole Hensley, Louisiana, Texas Governors Vow to Fight Supreme
Court Ruling on Gay Marriage While Others Pledge to Comply, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS (June 26, 2015, 5:09 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/
governors-vow-disobey-scotus-ruling-gay-marriage-article-1.2272503.
8. Administrative Order of the Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme
Court (Feb. 8, 2015), http://www.scribd.com/doc/255138696/Moore-Order-to
-Ala-Probate-Judges.
9. See Alan Blinder & Richard Pérez-Peña, Kentucky Clerk Denies SameSex Marriage Licenses, Defying Court, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2015), http://www
.nytimes.com/2015/09/02/us/same-sex-marriage-kentucky-kim-davis.html.
10. See, e.g., Paige Cornwell, Amid Indiana Controversy, Donations Soar
for Washington Florist Who Refused Gay Wedding, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 4,
2015, 1:12 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/amid-indiana
-controversy-donations-soar-for-washington-florist-who-refused-gay-wedding;
Curtis M. Wong, Georgia Florists Say They Won’t Serve Gay Couples Even as
State’s Religious Freedom Act Stalls, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 3, 2015, 4:19
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/03/georgia-florist-gay-wedding_
n_7001288.html (discussing Georgia florists as well as the Indiana pizzeria
that refused to cater same-sex weddings).
11. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
12. Briefly, the backlash thesis is “the proposition that litigation does
more harm than good for social change movements by producing
countermobilization that makes reform goals more difficult to receive.” Scott
L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57
UCLA L. REV. 1235, 1237 (2010) (discussing the two scholars, Gerald Rosenberg and Michael Klarman, most closely associated with advancing this thesis
with regard to marriage equality based on their analysis of what occurred after Brown).
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were critical of the prospects for marriage equality litigation to
13
bring about change.
Further, what other changes lie ahead for LGBT civil
rights? Though same-sex adult couples can now get married
and have their marriages recognized in every state, they can
still be fired from their jobs in twenty-nine states for being
14
gay, and in many states can be discriminated against with re15
gard to housing and public accommodations. Liberty and
equality seem a long way off. One commentator notes that
“[t]he pioneering states that first extended marriage rights to
same-sex couples did so only after they had first enacted work16
place nondiscrimination laws.” In pronouncing marriage
equality, did the Court get ahead of itself?
Only time will tell what course LGBT civil rights will take,
with many struggles to come in federal and state legislative
and administrative arenas, and of course in the courts. How
will LGBT antidiscrimination law develop? The relevant canon
of Supreme Court jurisprudence on this issue is pretty thin,
17
18
with Obergefell joining Romer v. Evans, Lawrence v. Texas,
13. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge),
104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 459–73 (2005) (detailing the negative consequences for
same-sex marriage following Lawrence); Gerald N. Rosenberg, Courting Disaster: Looking for Change in All the Wrong Places, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 795, 813–14
(2006) (“Litigation substitutes symbols for substance. . . . Without political
support, court decisions will not produce social change.”). As the tide shifted,
Klarman has walked back his backlash prediction. See Michael J. Klarman,
Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and Racial Equality, 127 HARV. L.
REV. 127, 148 (2013) (“[W]e have no way of knowing whether a broad constitutional ruling in favor of gay marriage would have generated political backlash
on the same scale that Brown and Roe did. Yet there is reason to believe that
it would not have.”).
14. Kevin Short, The 29 States Where You Can Still Be Fired for Being
Gay, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 30, 2014, 3:43 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/2014/10/30/fired-for-being-gay_n_6076492.html. For more detailed information about state non-discrimination laws, see Non-Discrimination Laws:
State by State Information—Map, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/map/non
-discrimination-laws-state-state-information-map (last visited Mar. 31, 2016).
15. See Erik Eckholm, Next Fight for Gay Rights: Bias in Jobs and Housing, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/us/gay
-rights-leaders-push-for-federal-civil-rights-protections.html.
16. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Marriage Equality, Workplace Inequality: The Next Gay Rights Battle, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1099, 1115 (2015).
17. 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996) (finding unconstitutional a state constitutional amendment that prevented state and local governments from enacting,
adopting, or enforcing “any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby
homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class
of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected
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19

and United States v. Windsor. Will advances for LGBT individuals and communities occur notwithstanding the ongoing retrenchment of rights for racial minorities as well as the
maintenance of racially disparate outcomes for certain racial
20
minorities, leading to further division and stratification? Will
the Supreme Court’s LGBT jurisprudence follow a course simi21
lar to the Court’s race jurisprudence?
This Article takes up these questions, drawing from Alan
David Freeman’s groundbreaking article, Legitimizing Racial
Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical
Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, in which he claims that not
only did federal antidiscrimination law develop in a way that
failed to redress racial inequality but, moreover, served to legit22
imize racial discrimination. Part I is descriptive and sets forth
the Freeman hypothesis in greater detail and reviews his periodization of Supreme Court race cases. Freeman, in a later article, revisited this topic and examined cases through 1989.
Part I extends the analysis to review Supreme Court race cases
23
since 1989 to see if the Freeman hypothesis still holds. Drawstatus or claim of discrimination”).
18. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986), and finding a liberty interest in the Due Process Clause under which
“[t]he State cannot demean . . . [the] existence [of] [two adults, who with full
and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a
homosexual lifestyle] or control their destiny by making their private sexual
conduct a crime”).
19. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (finding unconstitutional the Defense of
Marriage Act which defined marriage as applying only to heterosexual unions). I do not include Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013), the
case involving a constitutional challenge to California’s Proposition 22, that
had defined marriage as the union between one man and one woman, since a
5–4 majority of the Court did not reach the merits of the challenge because it
found that the petitioners in Hollingsworth lacked standing.
20. See infra Part II.A.
21. See infra Part I and Part II.B.
22. Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62
MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978) [hereinafter Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination].
23. Professor Freeman revisited his thesis approximately a decade later in
Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View from 1989, 64 TUL. L. REV.
1407 (1990) [hereinafter Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law]. He passed away
in 1996 so we do not have the benefit of his characterization and critique of the
Court’s post-1989 race jurisprudence. A moving set of remembrances of him as
a teacher, scholar, and human being can be found in the Buffalo Law Review.
See Colloquy, A Gathering to Remember Alan Freeman, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 613
(1996) (featuring contributions by Barry B. Boyer, Peter Gabel, Anthony
Kronman, Thomas E. Headrick, Sara Nichols, Bill Magavern, Al Katz, Thomas
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ing from Freeman’s periodization and the course of race antidiscrimination law, Part II is conjectural and speculates on the
course of antidiscrimination law as it relates to LGBT civil
rights. It argues that Freeman’s hypothesis will likely hold true
for LGBT civil rights, though as with the course of race antidiscrimination law, there will be twists and turns along the way.
Part III is prescriptive and poses the “so what” question. If we
accept Freeman’s hypothesis as correct with regard to race antidiscrimination law and predictive with regard to LGBT antidiscrimination law, what ought we to do? The Article concludes
by suggesting that we take up Freeman’s call to redirect our
energy to other political institutions, including advocacy that
more intentionally develops state antidiscrimination jurisprudence.
I. THE FREEMAN HYPOTHESIS—ANTIDISCRIMINATION
LAW LEGITIMIZES RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
In 1978, Alan David Freeman published Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine in the Minnesota Law
24
Review. Though the article emerged from Freeman’s partici25
pation in Critical Legal Studies (CLS), the article bridges CLS
26
and Critical Race Theory (CRT), playing a key role in both.
Given the article’s importance in CLS and CRT, it is no wonder
that the Minnesota Law Review chose it as one of the articles to
commemorate for its centennial celebration. In addition,
though citation counts are an imperfect and incomplete measSchofield, and John Henry Schlegel).
24. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 22.
25. Freeman’s authorial footnote for Legitimizing Racial Discrimination
thanks scholars from the Conference on Critical Legal Studies. See id. at 1049
n.*. He self identifies as a CLS scholar and defends himself and CLS against
the pieces that launch CRT. See Alan Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Quest
for Equality of Opportunity: A Critical Legal Essay, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
295, 296 (1988) (responding to Symposium, Minority Critiques of the Critical
Legal Studies Movement, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297 (1987)).
26. For example, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination is included in one of
the two initial CRT readers as one of the key writings that formed CRT. See
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT
29–46 (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); cf. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw,
The First Decade: Critical Reflections, or “A Foot in the Closing Door,” 49
UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1363 n.22 (including Alan Freeman among “Anglo scholars whose articles are key texts within CRT”). See generally Mario Barnes,
“The More Things Change . . .”: New Moves for Legitimizing Racial Discrimination in a “Post-Race” World, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2043 (2016) (discussing the
jurisprudential place of Freeman’s work).
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27

ure of influence, this article was recognized in 1996 as being
ranked 82nd on a list of the “Most-Cited Law Review Articles of
28
All Time.” Since 1996, it has continued to garner scholarly at29
tention.
Freeman begins Legitimizing Racial Discrimination with
the following observation: “[A]s surely as the law has outlawed
racial discrimination, it has affirmed that Black Americans can
be without jobs, have their children in all-black, poorly funded
schools, have no opportunities for decent housing, and have
very little political power, without any violation of antidiscrim30
ination law.” First, it is important to set forth what Freeman
understood to constitute federal antidiscrimination law. He defines it as “federal constitutional and statutory law, as expounded or interpreted by the United States Supreme Court,
31
defining the conduct to be treated as racial discrimination.”
Freeman then reviews twenty-five years of Supreme Court doctrine to show how it came to be that Black inequality can exist
32
and persist notwithstanding federal antidiscrimination law.
In addition to being “technical assertions of legal doctrine,” Supreme Court opinions “not only reflect dominant societal moral
positions, but also serve as part of the process of forming or
33
crystallizing such positions.” Because federal antidiscrimination law determines what is and is not discrimination, the fact
that Black inequality exists and persists must occur for reasons

27. One should be careful, though, what conclusions one draws from citation counts. See Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 563 (1984) (commenting on the lack of attention paid to the work of minority scholars writing in the
area of antidiscrimination law, describing “an inner circle of about a dozen
white, male writers who comment on, take polite issue with, extol, criticize,
and expand on each other’s ideas”).
28. See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 751, 767, 770 (1996) (based on citations in Social Sciences
Citation Index from 1956 through May 1995).
29. The article’s influence and impact as measured by citations has continued, with 390 citations after May 1995 in WESTLAW LAW REVIEWS & JOURNALS,
https://a.next.westlaw.com/search/home.html
(follow
“Secondary
Sources” hyperlink; then follow “Law Reviews & Journals” hyperlink; then
search “(alan /2 freeman) /5 legitimizing & da(aft 5/31/1995)”) (search conducted Mar. 31, 2016).
30. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 22, at 1050.
31. Id. at 1050 n.8.
32. Id. at 1057–118.
33. Id. at 1051 (footnote omitted).
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34

other than discrimination. It is in this sense that Black inequality is legitimized.
The Court has created a crimped vision of what constitutes
discrimination, such that federal antidiscrimination law, in addition to being ineffectual in redressing Black inequality, actually legitimizes racial discrimination by rationalizing inequality
as not resulting from discrimination. For Freeman, antidiscrimination law fits within a vision of law that “serves largely
to legitimize the existing social structure,” though its operation
must be sufficiently “credible for those whose allegiance it
35
seeks as well as those whose self-interest it rationalizes.” In
other words, in order for the Court to fulfill its legitimation
function, we must continue to believe in the utility of antidis36
crimination law despite its ultimate and intended futility. Antidiscrimination law, then, contains within it a dangerous contradiction.
Further, this understanding of antidiscrimination law is
not part of the standard civil rights narrative, which presumes
a self-correcting mechanism that moves us steadily, though if
at times inconsistently, toward racial equality. Instead, Freeman’s analysis is consistent with Derrick Bell’s notion of inter37
est convergence as it operates in the context of civil rights.

34. Freeman makes this point in the following hypothetical:
Suppose one were to visit the future society of racial irrelevance and
discover conditions that in any other society might be regarded as
corresponding with a pattern of racial discrimination. Among such
conditions might be that one race seems to have a hugely disproportionate share of the worse houses, the most demeaning jobs, and the
least control over societal resources. For such conditions to be fair and
accepted as legitimate by the disfavored race in future society, they
would have to be perceived as produced by accidental, impartial, or
neutral phenomena utterly dissociated from any racist practice.
Id. at 1074–75.
35. Id. at 1051.
36. Cf. Guyora Binder, On Critical Legal Studies as Guerrilla Warfare, 76
GEO. L.J. 1, 29 (1987). Binder, commenting on law’s legitimation function,
notes:
If the actors in American politics are directed by shared values rather
than opposing interests, then it is conceivable that the political process will transfer wealth and power from those with more to those
with less. If the political process will lead to the empowerment of the
weak and the enrichment of the poor, then the poor and weak have no
need to use or threaten violence in order to achieve justice.
Id.
37. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the InterestConvergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524–25 (1980) (discussing the
convergence of interests that led to Brown I).
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Bell observed that advances for racial minorities tended to occur when they served the interests of those in society with pow38
er. Thus, one way to understand Brown v. Board of Education
is that it came about not (merely) because of the immorality or
illegality of segregation but because of the convergence of interests: “whites in policymaking positions able to see the economic
and political advances at home and abroad that would follow
abandonment of segregation” and “reassurance to American
blacks that the precepts of equality and freedom so heralded
39
during World War II might yet be given meaning at home.”
To help elucidate his hypothesis, Freeman uses the notion
of perpetrator and victim perspectives.
A. THE PERPETRATOR AND VICTIM PERSPECTIVES
Freeman notes that there are different ways that one
might understand racial discrimination and offers the victim
and perpetrator perspectives as possibilities the Court could
have followed.
From the victim’s perspective, racial discrimination describes those
conditions of actual social existence as a member of a perpetual underclass. This perspective includes . . . the objective conditions of
life—lack of jobs, lack of money, lack of housing . . . . The perpetrator
perspective sees racial discrimination not as conditions, but as actions, or series of actions, inflicted on the victim by the perpetrator.
The focus is more on what particular perpetrators have done or are
doing to some victims than it is on the overall life situation of the vic40
tim class.

A clear tension exists between these perspectives and the
possibilities for antidiscrimination law, depending on what perspective would dominate. If the victim’s perspective had become
the animating force behind federal antidiscrimination law, we
might find ourselves in a very different place, with different
outcomes than what we see. Instead, the perpetrator perspective has won out, where racial discrimination takes “place in a
38. Bell observed:
It follows that the availability of fourteenth amendment protection in
racial cases may not actually be determined by the character of harm
suffered by blacks or the quantum of liability proved against whites.
Racial remedies may instead be the outward manifestations of unspoken and perhaps subconscious judicial conclusions that the remedies,
if granted, will secure, advance, or at least not harm societal interests
deemed important by middle and upper class whites.
Id. at 523.
39. Id. at 524–25.
40. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 22, at 1052–
53 (footnotes omitted).
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virtually ahistorical realm where atomistic individuals ‘intentionally’ ‘cause’ harm to other individuals, in short, reducing
41
the problem to one of tort.” These elements are constructed in
such a way as to severely narrow what is legally recognized as
discrimination.
Though ultimately the perpetrator perspective would prevail, post-Brown jurisprudence shows that this was not inevitable. What follows is a periodization of federal antidiscrimination law as described by Freeman up until 1989. The
periodization from 1989 attempts to extend Freeman’s analysis
to the present. A review of these cases shows antidiscrimination law’s dangerous contradiction.
B. PERIODIZING FEDERAL ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW—RACE
CASES
1. 1954–1965: The Era of Uncertainty
Brown I ushered in what Freeman describes as an era of
42
uncertainty. Part of the uncertainty came from the lack of
clarity with regard to the doctrinal basis for its ultimate conclusion that segregation in public schools constituted a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. There were critics like
43
44
Herbert Wechsler and defenders like Charles Black. For
Wechsler, who questioned the factual basis for segregation being harmful to blacks, assuming equal facilities as the Brown
court did, the only doctrinal basis for the decision had to be
45
based on the “denial by the state of freedom to associate.” The
problem for Wechsler was that “if the freedom of association is
denied by segregation, integration forces an association upon
46
those for whom it is unpleasant or repugnant.” Thus, in the
absence of a neutral constitutional principle, the Court in

41. Alan D. Freeman, Truth and Mystification in Legal Scholarship, 90
YALE L.J. 1229, 1235 (1981).
42. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 22, at 1057.
43. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,
73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31–34 (1959) (criticizing the doctrinal basis of Brown, finding no neutral constitutional principle upon which the decision could be
based).
44. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69
YALE L.J. 421, 424–28 (1960) (responding to Wechsler and finding racial
equality to be the neutral constitutional principle supporting Brown I).
45. Wechsler, supra note 43, at 34.
46. Id.
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Brown I essentially undertook a legislative function in determining whose associational interests would prevail.
To this, Derrick Bell responds, “To doubt that racial segregation is harmful to blacks, and to suggest that what blacks really sought was the right to associate with whites, is to believe
in a world that does not exist now and could not possibly have
47
existed then.” Wechsler’s approach is both ahistorical and
acontextual, in some ways presaging techniques the Court
would later use to contain and constrain what it had started in
Brown I and in its development of antidiscrimination law.
Charles Black, on the other hand, found the question as to
whether segregation could constitute equal treatment within
48
the historical context of the United States to be laughable.
Aside from the lack of doctrinal clarity, much of the uncertainty about civil rights possibilities that might follow Brown I
stemmed from the disjuncture between the constitutional violation and the remedy. Rather than striking down segregated
public education and mandating integration, the Court remanded the cases to the lower courts the following year in
Brown II:
Full implementation . . . may require solution of varied local school
problems. School authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems; courts will have to
consider whether the action of school authorities constitutes good
faith implementation of the governing constitutional principles. Because of their proximity to local conditions and the possible need for
further hearings, the courts which originally heard these cases can
49
best perform this judicial appraisal.

With that, we were given the infamous direction given to
the district courts “to take such proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary
and proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these cas50
es.”
Because the determination of any remedies required attention to the particular local conditions in each school district,
remedies were limited to the parties in these cases. Students in
school districts other than those directly involved in the cases
consolidated in Brown I and II had to file their own lawsuits if
they wanted a measure of relief under the constitutional prin47.
48.
49.
50.

Bell, supra note 37, at 522.
Black, supra note 44, at 421.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955).
Id. at 301 (emphasis added).
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ciples articulated in Brown I. We see in Brown I and II the
Court giving voice to both the perpetrator and victim perspectives. Though the condition of Blacks subjected to segregated
education (victim’s perspective) provides the basis for the
Court’s finding of constitutional violation, a remedy that would
vindicate the victim’s perspective—the immediate outlawing of
school segregation—is refused in Brown II and, instead, aggrieved parties must assert and prove their claim of constitutional violation committed by a particular perpetrator and seek
51
and enforce that remedy against that perpetrator.
Though Brown contained within it great promise, the
Court’s doctrinal imprecision, failure to commit to a remedy,
and limitation of the remedy to the parties in the original lawsuits makes this a period of uncertainty.
2. 1965–1974: The Era of Contradiction
In some ways, Freeman’s Era of Contradiction is ushered
52
in, and perhaps necessitated, by the Civil Rights Act of 1964
53
and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. With far-reaching legislation to reach what had been outside of constitutional purview
as private discrimination or a matter for the states, the Court
had to determine first whether the legislation was constitutional and second what could be accomplished under the statutes.
When Congress had previously attempted to regulate public accommodations in the Civil Rights Act of 1875, the Court,
in the Civil Rights Cases, had found that Congress had overreached. Justice Bradley famously stated:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent
legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state,
there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he
takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite
54
of the laws . . . .

With that, Justice Bradley found unconstitutional the portions
of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 that forbid discrimination on the
basis of race with regard to access to public accommodations.
He held that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited racially
discriminatory state action but that the Fourteenth Amend51. See discussion of desegregation cases infra Part I.B.2.
52. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a–2000a-6 (2012)).
53. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as
amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10101 (2014)).
54. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
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ment did not reach “[i]ndividual invasion of individual rights.”
Justice Bradley constructed a divide based on the public and
the private, stating:
The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any such [State]
authority, is simply a private wrong, . . . but if not sanctioned in some
way by the State, or not done under State authority, his rights remain
in full force, and may presumably be vindicated by resort to the laws
56
of the State for redress.

Because the first and second sections of the Civil Rights Act of
1875 tried to regulate private conduct “not sanctioned in some
57
way by the State, or not done under State authority,” there
58
was no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Congress
59
exceeded its authority under the Thirteenth Amendment.
This time around, the Court would uphold the 1960s civil
60
rights acts, but had the task of determining the doctrinal requirements to establish violations and appropriate remedies.
The Court would shift from the uncertainty of the earlier period
and enter into a period of contradiction where some cases
seemed to reflect the victim perspective with others reflecting
the perpetrator perspective. Within these contradictions, the
seeds of doctrinal instability were planted that would enable
the Court, years later, to resurrect the ghost of Justice Brad61
ley. Lurking in the cases are themes that begin to emerge
more strongly as the years go by: a concern about unfairly burdening whites and overcompensating blacks.
For example, in City of Richmond v. United States, the
Court was faced with whether the city’s annexation of approx55. Id. at 11.
56. Id. at 17.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 19 (finding that “such plenary power” was not granted to Congress by the Fourteenth Amendment).
59. Id. at 21 (“[The] power to pass the law is not found in the Thirteenth
Amendment.”). Though the Civil Rights Cases has not been overruled, and in
fact has been cited positively in Romer v. Evans, it has been partially abrogated, at least with regard to the ability of Congress to reach purely private conduct in order “to eradicate conditions that prevent Negroes from buying and
renting property because of their race or color.” Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409, 438 (1968); cf. United States v. Cannon, 750 F.3d 492, 499 (5th
Cir. 2014) (discussing the change in the interpretation of Congress’s power
under the Thirteenth Amendment to reach private conduct from the Civil
Rights Cases to Alfred H. Mayer).
60. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
61. See infra notes 175–77 and accompanying text.

2016]

LGBT AND RACE DISCRIMINATION

2115

imately twenty-three square miles of adjacent county land accompanied by a change in its at-large election of city council
members was permissible under the Voting Rights Act of
62
1965. Richmond was subject to § 5 of the Voting Rights Act,
which required preclearance by the Attorney General or approval by federal court of any change in voting qualifications or
63
prerequisites. The proposed annexed territory had a population that was overwhelmingly white—45,705 whites (96.7%)
64
and 1557 blacks (3.3%). The effect of annexation was to
change the racial composition of Richmond, which preannexation was 52% black/48% white to post-annexation, 42%
65
black/58% white. One of the questions before the Court was
whether annexation would result in black voter dilution. On its
face, it appears that annexation would take a majority black
city and make it majority white. However, because annexation
was to be accompanied by a switch from an at-large system to a
ward or district system, the key inquiry for the Court was not
whether blacks would go from the majority to a minority in the
newly composed city; instead, all the Court asked was whether
the black vote pre-annexation would be diluted postannexation. In other words, in the newly composed city, would
66
blacks be underrepresented on the council? In this newly
composed city, where blacks would now constitute 42% of the
population and wards/districts were drawn such that four of
the nine wards (44.4%) would have a majority black population,
the black vote in the newly composed city could not be said to
67
be diluted. Instead, taken as a whole, the changes were
thought to comport with fairness. Further, the effort to have
wards/districts drawn that would create black majorities in five
of the nine wards/districts was thought to victimize whites because it would “allocate to the Negro community in the larger
city the voting power or the seats on the city council in excess of
its proportion in the new community and thus permanently . . .
68
underrepresent other elements in the community [whites].”
Ignored is the fact that prior to annexation, blacks constituted
a majority, approximately 5/9 of the total population. Annexa62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

422 U.S. 358, 359–60 (1975).
Id. at 361–62.
Id. at 363.
Id.
Id. at 371–72.
Id.
Id. at 373.
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tion was viewed as a neutral act and all that mattered was the
possibility of proportional representation pre- and postannexation. The fact that blacks went from the majority (5/9) to
the minority (4/9) was, in the absence of evidence of invidious
discrimination, not seen as a dilution of their vote because
blacks retained the prospect of proportional representation
post-annexation.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 included Title VII—Equal
69
Employment Opportunity. The Court, though, would have to
determine what it meant for an employer “to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi70
vidual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” In Griggs
v. Duke Power, the Court was faced with an employer’s ostensibly neutral practices that had a racially disproportionate im71
pact. This sets up the tension between the perpetrator perspective and the victim perspective. Under the perpetrator
perspective, nothing is inferred from the fact of racially disproportionate outcomes; the Court accepted the conclusion of the
lower courts that Duke Power “had adopted the diploma and
test requirements without any ‘intention to discriminate
72
against Negro employees.’” However, Griggs, by demanding a
“justification of ostensibly neutral practices” producing racially
disproportionate outcomes, shifts “from an emphasis on ‘motivation’ to one on ‘consequences’ mark[ing] a transformation of
the notion of intent in anti-discrimination law. Henceforth, the
intentional continuation of a course of conduct producing racially disproportionate results would be actionable, regardless of
73
why the actor chose to continue [absent business necessity].”
Because this notion of disparate impact was not codified in
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, it was expected to apply
to aspects of employment practices beyond hiring, “especially
seniority, and to other statutory and constitutional violations in
areas such as school desegregation, voting, housing, land use

69. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a–2000a-6 (2012)).
70. Id. § 703(a)(1).
71. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 427–28 (1971) (examining the
completion of high school and satisfactory scores on two general intelligence
tests).
72. Id. at 432 (citation omitted).
73. Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 23, at 1422.
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regulation, and provision of governmental services.” If it had,
courts would advance the victim perspective and would address
conditions and outcomes. One commentator, writing the year
after Griggs, suggested that the decision would help address
institutional racism so that employers could not rely upon “the
results of segregation—cultural and educational deprivation—
75
to become a justification for the perpetuation of segregation.”
In addition, it was presumed that
Neutral practices producing racially disproportionate results would
have to be justified; that, for the purposes of antidiscrimination law,
intent would mean no more than voluntary conduct producing racially
disproportionate results; and that the best way to avoid or at least defer the impact of the first two was to initiate a voluntary affirmative
76
action program.

The Court in the next era, Rationalization, quashed those
expectations. Despite its language in Griggs that neutral practices “cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status
77
quo of prior discriminatory employment practices,” the Court
proceeded to legitimize the status quo in the next era.
3. 1974–1984: The Era of Rationalization
Insofar as Griggs offered “a genuine threat to the hegemony of the perpetrator perspective, then the major task of the era
78
of rationalization must be the obliteration of Griggs.” In the
era of rationalization, the Court “employed a method of containment to defeat any deviant victim perspective expecta79
tions.” Specifically, the Court began to deploy key aspects of
the perpetrator perspective through three legal concepts—
remedy, causation, intent—“insist[ing] on a neat correlation between violation and remedy, proof of objective causation of injury by the perpetrator, and proof of ‘intent,’ that is, purposeful
80
discrimination.”

74. Id.
75. Herbert N. Bernhardt, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.: The Implications for
Private and Public Employers, 50 TEX. L. REV. 901, 902 (1972).
76. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 22, at 1114–
15.
77. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430.
78. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 22, at 1114.
79. Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 23, at 1422.
80. Id. at 1418.
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a. Intent
Just five years after Griggs, the Court in Washington v.
81
Davis was faced with a “test that purported to measure verbal
ability, vocabulary, reading, and comprehension . . . [used] as a
criterion for admission to the training program for District of
82
Columbia police officers.” This test had a negative dispropor83
tionate impact in screening out black applicants. One key difference, though, was that Title VII was not yet applicable to
government employment so the legal challenge alleged a viola84
tion of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Though the plaintiffs lost at the district court, they prevailed
before the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,
which relied upon Griggs to govern the due process challenge
85
brought by the plaintiffs.
In reversing, the Supreme Court pronounced that Griggs’
disparate impact rubric was limited to Title VII and did not ap86
ply more broadly to due process or equal protection claims.
The Court used Washington v. Davis to refocus antidiscrimination law on intentional or invidious discrimination. It quickly
canvassed its Equal Protection jurisprudence and emphasized
that purposeful discrimination had to be established in order to
prove an equal protection violation with regard to the exclusion
of Negroes from grand and petit juries in criminal proceed87
88
89
ings, racial gerrymandering, and school desegregation.
The Court acknowledged that disparate impact may be a
factor among the totality of relevant facts from which an invid90
ious discriminatory purpose may be inferred. However, it emphasized that it disagreed with lower courts “to the extent that
81. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
82. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 22, at 1115.
83. Davis, 426 U.S. at 235.
84. The complaint also alleged two statutory violations, 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
and D.C. Code § 1-320, but partial summary judgment was sought by plaintiffs
only on the due process violation, which is the issue on appeal before the Supreme Court. Davis, 426 U.S. at 233–36.
85. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev’d, 426
U.S. 229 (1976).
86. Davis, 426 U.S. at 238–39.
87. Id. (citing Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403–04 (1945); Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880)).
88. Id. at 240 (citing Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964)).
89. Id. (“The essential element of de jure segregation is ‘a current condition of segregation resulting from intentional state action.’” (quoting Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 205 (1973))).
90. Id. at 242.
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those cases rested on or expressed the view that proof of discriminatory racial purpose is unnecessary in making out an
91
equal protection violation.” The Court expressed its concern
that:
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless
invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or
burdens one race more than another would be far reaching and would
raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range
of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that
may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to
92
the more affluent white.

Discriminatory purpose is the bedrock of antidiscrimination
law.
b. Remedy
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,
the Court had to decide if a remedy under Title VII could invalidate a seniority system in a collectively bargained agreement
93
that perpetuated the effects of pre-Title VII discrimination.
The Court acknowledged that the seniority system in question
had resulted in the situation where
because of the employer’s prior intentional discrimination, the line
drivers with the longest tenure are without exception white, the advantages of the seniority system flow disproportionately to them and
away from Negro and Spanish-surnamed employees who might by
now have enjoyed those advantages had not the employer discriminated before the passage of the Act. This disproportionate distribution
of advantages does in a very real sense “operate to ‘freeze’ the status
94
quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.”

Nevertheless, the Court determined that the literal terms
of Title VII and its legislative history provide a measure of im95
munity to such seniority systems. This protects the settled expectations of the beneficiaries of discrimination, as it would be
unfair to impose a remedy whose costs are borne by innocent
white workers when the constitutional violation was committed
by the perpetrator employer or union. The Court would express

91. Id. at 245. The Court cited numerous appellate and district court cases dealing with public employment, urban renewal, zoning, public housing,
and municipal services that had improperly extended Griggs. Id. at 244 n.12.
92. Id. at 248.
93. 431 U.S. 324, 343 (1977).
94. Id. at 349–50.
95. Id. at 350.
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this more strongly in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v.
96
Stotts, a case that in 1984 would usher in the Era of Denial.
c. Causation
As the Washington v. Davis Court noted in commenting on
its school desegregation cases, the result—segregated schools—
had to be linked directly to intentional state action. Causation
becomes a concept the Court manipulates to rationalize the status quo. Thus, “[d]espite extensive de jure segregation in the
City of Detroit, the Court refused to approve a remedy that
would consolidate Detroit schools with those of surrounding
97
suburbs for the purpose of achieving an integrated result.”
The Court reasoned that the perpetrator was the City of Detroit and not the (largely white) suburban school districts that
had not engaged in de jure segregation or the (white) parents
98
that had moved from the city to the suburbs. The Court emphasized that “without an interdistrict violation and
interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for
99
an interdistrict remedy.”
Freeman notes that the lessons from Milliken and San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, “which rejected
a claim of resource equalization among school districts without
regard to ability to pay,” were “stark and clear: if whites can
find a way to leave the inner city, they may legally insulate
their finances and schools from the demands of blacks for racial
100
equality.” Any segregative consequences that result from the
private actions of white families in response to school desegre101
gation are beyond the remedial power of the courts. In this
way, black inequality becomes rationalized as beyond the remedial reach of the courts.

96. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
97. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 22, at 1108
(discussing Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974)).
98. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 745.
99. Id.
100. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 22, at 1108.
101. Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler finishes what the Milliken Court started. 427 U.S. 424 (1976). Once a race-neutral plan was implemented, efforts by the district court to alter the plan to address post-remedy
intradistrict movement of families that resulted in resegregation of some of
the schools exceeded the court’s remedial authority. Id. at 433.
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4. 1984–????: The Era of Denial
Approximately a decade after Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, Freeman revisited his thesis and declared a new era,
Denial, during which the Court completes the
dismantling process that had begun in the period of rationalization . . . to reconsider, and reject, the implicit assumptions in Weber.
Once statistical disparities cease to be presumptive violations, and
remedies mandating numerical results are no longer required (or
even permitted), the reality of inequality experienced by black Americans becomes just another neutral feature of our socioeconomic land102
scape.

Though several affirmative action programs in the context
103
of employment were found to be constitutional, leading one
commentator to announce that “the effort to kill affirmative ac104
tion programs has failed,” this era saw the Justices giving
greater credence to the argument that affirmative action programs benefit non-victims and place unfair burdens on inno105
cent non-perpetrators.
The Court limited the reach of affirmative action in the
context of layoffs. In Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v.
106
107
and Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,
the
Stotts
Court rejected the authority of the trial court to protect recently hired minority workers with less seniority from layoffs in
contravention of an existing seniority system that favored
108
white workers with greater seniority. Stotts made clear that a
recently hired minority worker could be granted retroactive
seniority only if that worker proved that she or he was a victim
of past discrimination by that employer and could prove that
but for this discrimination, the worker would have been hired
109
and accrued seniority. However, in most instances, recently
102. Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 23, at 1426–27.
103. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cty., 480 U.S. 616 (1987);
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); Local 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986).
104. Herman Schwartz, The 1986 and 1987 Affirmative Action Cases: It’s
All Over but the Shouting, 86 MICH. L. REV. 524, 576 (1987).
105. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Disease As Cure: “In Order to Get Beyond
Racism, We Must First Take Account of Race,” 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 154
(“The affirmative action system now in place . . . is based upon concepts of racial indebtedness and racial entitlement rather than individual worth and individual need; that is to say, because it is racist.”).
106. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
107. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
108. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283–84; Stotts, 467 U.S. at 578.
109. Stotts, 467 U.S. at 578–79 (citing Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
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hired workers are not able to meet this high burden, and even
if discriminatory hiring practices are proven, “mere membership in the disadvantaged class is insufficient to warrant a sen110
iority award.”
Wygant was a reverse discrimination lawsuit brought by
white teachers who were laid off while minority teachers with
less seniority were retained. In finding that this practice violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Court noted that there was
a key difference between preferential hiring plans and preferential layoff plans: “While hiring goals impose a diffuse burden,
often foreclosing only one of several opportunities, layoffs impose the entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular
111
individuals . . . .” In describing the position of these innocent
(white) workers, the Court observed:
A worker may invest many productive years in one job and one city
with the expectation of earning the stability and security of seniority.
“At that point, the rights and expectations surrounding seniority
make up what is probably the most valuable capital asset that the
worker ‘owns,’ worth even more than the current equity in his home.”
Layoffs disrupt these settled expectations in a way that general hir112
ing goals do not.

These settled expectations become a property interest that the
law protects, even though “many white employees would not
have been hired in the first place” absent racial discrimination,
“and would therefore have no basis to claim seniority prefer113
ences.”
Several cases decided during October Term 1988 tried to
consolidate the pushback on civil rights that characterized the
114
Era of Denial. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio severely limited Griggs by requiring: (1) a more specific showing with reStates, 431 U.S. 324, 367–371 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S.
747 (1976)).
110. Id. at 579.
111. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283.
112. Id. (citation omitted).
113. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707,
1776 (1993).
114. See generally Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)
(overturning much of Griggs); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (permitting collateral challenge by white firefighters, jeopardizing consent decrees
that had resulted in remedial affirmative action policies); City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding that strict scrutiny is to be applied for race remedial affirmative action policies enacted by subnational governmental entities); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989)
(limiting Title VII to hiring and not harassment or other discrimination after
employment).
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gard to disparate impact to establish a prima facie case; (2) a
stricter demonstration of causation where a particular hiring
practice, rather than aggregate practices, had to be proven to
116
have a significant disparate impact; and (3) changing the
Griggs’ burden shifting regime so that once a prima facie case
was established, the employer had only a burden of producing
evidence of a business justification for the challenged practice,
but the “burden of persuasion, however, remain[ed] with the
117
disparate-impact plaintiff.”
Martin v. Wilks was another form of a reverse discrimination case in which white firefighters brought a collateral challenge to a consent decree that resulted in an affirmative action
program that included goals for hiring and promoting black
118
firefighters. The failure of the white firefighters to intervene
earlier in the proceedings leading to the consent decree was
held to not bar them from pursuing a later collateral chal119
lenge. The Court, in permitting this challenge by the white
firefighters, “invite[d] legal attack by aggrieved whites on
longstanding affirmative action programs originating in litigation, and it confers on whites a continuing right to complain
120
about reverse discrimination in court.”
Patterson v. McClean Credit Union involved a claim based
on 42 U.S.C. § 1981 brought by a black female employee who
claimed that she had been harassed, not promoted, and then
121
discharged, all because of her race. Though the Court affirmed its holding that § 1981 reaches private conduct and prohibits racial discrimination with regard to making and enforc122
ing contracts, it stated that § 1981 does not reach conduct by
123
the employer after contract formation. In refusing to reach
this private conduct, the Court stated:
The law now reflects society’s consensus that discrimination based on
the color of one’s skin is a profound wrong of tragic dimension. Neither our words nor our decisions should be interpreted as signaling
one inch of retreat from Congress’ policy to forbid discrimination in

115. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 654–55.
116. Id. at 656–58.
117. Id. at 659.
118. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 758.
119. Id. at 768.
120. Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 23, at 1432.
121. 491 U.S. 164, 169 (1989).
122. Id. at 175.
123. Id. at 179–80 (noting, though, that racial harassment during the
course of employment is actionable under Title VII).
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the private, as well as the public, sphere. Nevertheless, in the area of
private discrimination, to which the ordinance of the Constitution
does not directly extend, our role is limited to interpreting what Congress may do and has done. The statute before us, which is only part
of Congress’ extensive civil rights legislation, does not cover the acts
124
of harassment alleged here.

Even while severely limiting the reach of federal antidiscrimination law, the Court professed its commitment to the principle
of racial justice.
In these three cases (and in Price Waterhouse v.
125
kins ), the Court in its zeal to curtail even further the reach of
antidiscrimination law overplayed its hand. Congress, two
years later, would enact the Civil Rights Act of 1991 that would
126
overrule key aspects of the Supreme Court’s overreach.
One major case, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., from
that Supreme Court term survived and is an exemplar of the
127
technique of denial. Croson involved a challenge to the Richmond City Council’s Minority Business Utilization Plan, which
124. Id. at 188.
125. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (finding the causation requirement in Title VII
permits an employer to avoid liability if it can prove that it would have made
the same decision despite the existence of an improper discriminatory motive).
126. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 made these findings and expressed the
following purposes:
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds that—
(1) additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the workplace;
(2) the decision of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) has weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections; and
(3) legislation is necessary to provide additional protections
against unlawful discrimination in employment.
SEC. 3. PURPOSES.
The purposes of this Act are—
(1) to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination
and unlawful harassment in the workplace;
(2) to codify the concepts of “business necessity” and “job related”
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971), and in the other Supreme Court decisions
prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989);
(3) to confirm statutory authority and provide statutory guidelines for the adjudication of disparate impact suits under title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.); and
(4) to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2–3 (1991).
127. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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required “prime contractors to whom the city awarded construction contracts to subcontract at least 30% of the dollar
amount of the contract to one or more Minority Business En128
terprises.” Doctrinally, Croson is important because it established that remedial racial classifications are subject to the
129
same level of scrutiny as discriminatory racial classifications.
Justice O’Connor’s opinion observed that the program had been
enacted by a city council where five of its nine members were
black and noted that “[t]he concern that a political majority will
more easily act to the disadvantage of a minority based on unwarranted assumptions or incomplete facts would seem to militate for, not against, the application of heightened judicial scru130
tiny in this case.” Further, the Court emphasized that the
city of Richmond needed a strong basis in evidence in order to
131
justify remedial action. The fact that in a city with a 50%
black population where 0.67% of prime contracts in a five-year
period were awarded to minority contractors was insufficient
132
evidence. The fact that in 1977 Congress had determined
“that the effects of past discrimination had stifled minority participation in the construction industry nationally” did not provide a strong basis in evidence that this was the case in Rich133
mond. The fact that there were very few minority contractors
in local and state contractors’ associations was not enough. Nor
were statements that there had been past discrimination in the
134
construction industry. The Court went so far as to say that
“none of the evidence presented by the city points to any identi135
fied discrimination in the Richmond construction industry.”
We are left then with the world as it is—a city with a 50%
black population with 0.67% of prime contracts going to minori136
ty business enterprises —as being a fact disconnected from
racial discrimination, and thus, beyond the power of law to redress.
128. Id. at 477.
129. Id. at 493–94.
130. Id. at 495–96.
131. Id. at 500 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277
(1986)).
132. Id. at 499.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 500; see also id. at 501 (declaring that a “governmental actor
cannot render race a legitimate proxy for a particular condition merely by declaring that the condition exists”).
135. Id. at 505.
136. Id. at 479–80.
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The Court also found it troubling that Richmond’s set-aside
program also included Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Es137
kimo, or Aleut as minorities. Noting that Richmond may have
never had an Aleut or Eskimo citizen, that the program might
provide a remedy to someone who may have never suffered past
discrimination in the construction industry in Richmond was
seen to be grossly over-inclusive and to “strongly impugn[] the
138
city’s claim of remedial motivation.”
Croson provides the most striking example of denial when
the Court stated, with no sense of irony, that “[b]lacks may be
disproportionately attracted to industries other than construc139
tion.” One wonders if Justice O’Connor was talking about the
140
same Richmond as Justice Marshall. Justice Marshall opens
his dissent by stating, “It is a welcome symbol of racial progress
when the former capital of the Confederacy acts forthrightly to
141
confront the effects of racial discrimination in its midst.”
Marshall writes that this is the same Richmond whose
 1969 annexation plan “was infected by the impermissible
purpose of denying the right to vote based on race
through perpetuating white majority power to exclude
142
Negroes from office through at-large elections”;
 “sordid history of . . . [its] attempts to circumvent, defeat,
and nullify the holding of Brown I has been recorded in
143
the opinions of this and other courts”; and
 “numerous public and private acts of discrimination” tended to “perpetuate apartheid of the races in ghetto pat144
terns throughout the city . . . .”
137. See id. at 506 (“There is absolutely no evidence of past discrimination
against Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut persons in any
aspect of the Richmond construction industry.”).
138. Id. (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 284 n.13
(1986)).
139. Id. at 503.
140. Compare the different histories in Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion
with Marshall’s dissent. Id.
141. Id. at 528. See generally Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68
TEX. L. REV. 381 (1989). For further analysis of Croson, see Peter Charles
Hoffer, “Blind to History”: The Use of History in Affirmative Action Suits: Another Look at City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 23 RUTGERS L.J. 271
(1992).
142. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 373 (1975) (discussing and adopting the Special Master’s conclusions about the earlier annexation plan); see also supra text accompanying notes 63–68.
143. Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of Richmond, 462 F.2d 1058, 1075 (4th Cir. 1972)
(Winter, J., dissenting), aff’d, 412 U.S. 92 (1973).
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Notwithstanding these facts, the Croson Court comments
that “it is sheer speculation how many minority firms there
145
would be in Richmond absent past societal discrimination.”
The world made by discrimination becomes frozen as the status
quo; black inequality is rationalized and then denied.
C. EXTENDING FREEMAN’S PERIODIZATION

146

A year after Freeman’s Antidiscrimination Law article, the
Supreme Court decided Board of Education of Oklahoma City
147
Public Schools v. Dowell. The Court expressed the view that
desegregation decrees were not intended to operate into perpetuity, and that a district court, in determining whether to dissolve a desegregation decree, did not have to find that the ves148
tiges of past discrimination had been eliminated. Instead, the
correct inquiry was whether the school district had complied in
good faith with the desegregation decree and the vestiges of
past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practica149
ble. This made it much easier for school districts to establish
that they had achieved unitary status, which would end federal
court supervision. Perhaps it should not come as a surprise
that desegregation peaked in the early 1990s, with resegrega150
tion occurring thereafter.
A set of three cases decided in 1995 marks the end of the
era of denial and the ushering in of what some describe as post151
civil rights America. In Miller v. Johnson, the Court empha144. Id. at 1065.
145. Croson, 488 U.S. at 499.
146. Professor Freeman passed away in 1995 and did not revisit his thesis
after his 1990 Antidiscrimination Law article.
147. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
148. Id. at 249–50.
149. Id.
150. See Sam Erman & Gregory M. Walton, Stereotype Threat and Antidiscrimination Law: Affirmative Steps to Promote Meritocracy and Racial Equality in Education, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 321 (2015) (citing GARY ORFIELD ET
AL., E. PLURIBUS . . . SEPARATION: DEEPENING DOUBLE SEGREGATION FOR
MORE STUDENTS, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT 17–19, 22–23, 32–33, 76–77 (2012),
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and
-diversity/mlk-national/e-pluribus...separation-deepening-double-segregation
-for-more-students/orfield_epluribus_revised_omplete_2012.pdf).
151. Though the term “post-civil rights era” is used sometimes to refer to
the period after the 1960s civil rights acts, I use it to refer to the period where
“Supreme Court decisions have departed [dramatically] from established civil
rights approaches.” See Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender,
Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title
VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1087 (1992)
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sized that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was intended to grant
“authority to the federal courts to uncover official efforts to
abridge minorities’ right to vote” but not to require states to
engage in “presumptively unconstitutional race-based district152
ing.” In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the Court finished what it had begun in Croson by extending the application
of strict scrutiny of all racial classifications by state and local
153
governments to the federal government. In both Miller and
Adarand, the racial remedy is equated with, and found equally
154
offensive to, racial discrimination. In Missouri v. Jenkins, the
Court clarified its holding in Milliken I, which found
interdistrict remedies to be beyond the remedial authority of
the district court if it extended to “innocent” districts in which
segregation could not be said to have been caused by the offend155
ing district. In Jenkins, the state of Missouri and the offending district attempted to attract (white) students from other
districts (the suburbs) by spending a lot of money to create
156
magnet schools in the offending district. The Jenkins Court
ruled that this was an impermissible attempt to do an end run
157
around its holding in Milliken I. In addition, the Jenkins
158
Court expressed what might be termed “racial exhaustion,”
noting at the outset of its opinion that “[a]s this school desegregation litigation enters its 18th year, we are called upon again
(“[W]e inhabit a period that is widely described as the ‘post-Civil Rights era.’”).
The term “post-civil rights America” starts to make its way into the law review
literature in the early 1990s. See, e.g., John O. Calmore, Critical Race Theory,
Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a
Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129, 2206 n.284 (1992) (noting “at
least 12 themes reflected in the move from the civil rights era of the mid-1960s
to the present post-civil rights era”); Eric K. Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances:
Agency, Responsibility and Interracial Justice, 3 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 33, 36
(1995) (describing the post-civil rights era as marked by “the end of the civil
rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s and the ideological dismantling of
civil rights approaches to racial justice”).
152. 515 U.S. 900, 927 (1995).
153. 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[W]e hold today that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local government actor, must be
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”).
154. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
155. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974).
156. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 76–77.
157. Id. at 94.
158. Darren Hutchinson explores the theme of racial exhaustion, describing Justice Bradley’s opinion in the Civil Rights Cases as an exemplar and
how it has played out in history and in contemporary politics and jurisprudence. See generally Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Racial Exhaustion, 86 WASH.
U. L. REV. 917 (2009).
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159

to review the decisions of the lower courts.” This echoed the
opinion in Dowell that desegregation decrees were not intended
to operate into perpetuity. One can be “special favorites” for on160
ly so long.
The next two decades would see more iterations of a postcivil rights America. In Shelby County v. Holder, the Court
went beyond Miller and found that the § 4(b) formula for determining which jurisdictions are subject to the preclearance
requirements of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act to be unconstitu161
tional.
In Ricci v. DeStefano, a reverse discrimination lawsuit
brought by one Hispanic and seventeen white firefighters, the
Court had to address the inevitable tension between disparate
treatment and disparate impact when an employer acted af162
firmatively to avoid disparate impact. In 2003, the New Haven Fire Department administered a test to fill a number of
163
openings for promotion to lieutenant and captain. The pass
rate for African Americans and Hispanics was far lower than it
164
was for whites. When the city recognized that the promotion
exam had a disproportionate negative impact on black and
Hispanic applicants, the city’s Civil Service Board, an independent review board that must vote to certify test results before the promotion process could continue, held hearings and
165
ultimately refused to certify the test results. As a result,
166
promotions were not given. The reverse discrimination claim
alleged that New Haven, regardless of its potential liability for
disparate impact had it accepted the test results, had engaged
167
in disparate treatment on the basis of race.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, assumed that because the city looked at the results and saw the racially disparate impact, it must have known that refusing to certify the test
results would negatively affect a group of test takers who nec-

159. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 73.
160. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
161. 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
162. 557 U.S. 557 (2009). Justice Scalia in his concurrence makes clear
that the Court has deferred deciding what he describes as “the war between
disparate impact and equal protection.” Id. at 595.
163. Id. at 566.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 567–74.
166. Id. at 574.
167. Id. at 575.
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168

essarily were predominantly white. Thus, the city’s race conscious decision, seeking to avoid a racially disproportionate impact, was taken as intentional racial discrimination against the
169
group that had performed well on the test. Justice Kennedy
recognized the tension between disparate impact and disparate
treatment. Can the fear of disparate impact liability justify disparate treatment? Justice Kennedy resolved this question by
articulating a new standard under which New Haven might be
able to avoid disparate treatment liability if there was a strong
basis in evidence that, had it not taken the action, it would
170
have been liable under the disparate impact statute. One
problem though is that the Court leaves open the possibility
that even if an employer meets the “strong-basis-in-evidence
standard,” this will not necessarily insulate an employer from
liability from a disparate treatment plaintiff; a strong basis in
evidence of disparate impact may still not justify discriminato171
ry treatment under the Constitution. Ricci sets up the inevitable conflict between disparate impact and disparate treatment that may complete the attempt by the October Term 1988
Supreme Court to essentially overturn Griggs, despite the explicit statutory espousal of Griggs in the Civil Rights Act of
1991.
An additional aspect of this case relates to the question of
what is the appropriate temporal framework. When one reads
Justice Kennedy’s opinion or Justice Alito’s concurrence, the
facts in this case are presented as if there were no past. We
have only the disappointed meritorious firefighters, the City of
New Haven, and various public officials who worked to block
their promotions. This might be contrasted with Justice Ginsberg’s approach. She notes the long, pervasive history of racial
172
discrimination practiced by municipal fire departments. She
notes that New Haven shared in this history, including a 1973
168. Id. at 584.
169. One wonders if any affirmative action program in any context could
survive this logic. For example, if a school selected a race neutral alternative
that produced the desired race conscious result, one commentator points out
that “it is unclear why those alternatives would not themselves violate the
Washington v. Davis prohibition on intentional discrimination.” Girardeau A.
Spann, Good Faith Discrimination, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 585, 602–03
(2015).
170. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 585.
171. Id. at 584 (“We also do not hold that meeting the strong-basis-inevidence standard would satisfy the Equal Protection Clause in a future
case.”).
172. Id. at 610.
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lawsuit by black firefighters that resulted in 1974 consent decree that was largely ineffective in diversifying the fire de173
partment. Justice Ginsberg argued that the city’s actions had
to be placed within this context. However, her view did not carry the day, and as we have seen in the course of antidiscrimination law, it is applied in an ahistorical manner. Divorced from
history, perhaps it is no wonder that the Court found in favor of
174
the reverse discrimination plaintiffs.
In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1, the Court examined the legal question of
“whether a public school that had not operated legally segregated schools or has been found to be unitary may choose to
classify students by race and rely upon that classification in
175
making school assignments” and answered it in the nega176
tive. The Court’s opinion concludes with a sentence that revives the ghost of Justice Bradley, where racial minorities can
no longer depend on being the special favorites of the law. Justice Roberts pronounces, “The way to stop discrimination on the
177
basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”
Under this reasoning, any form of racial remediation is itself
racial discrimination.
If only it were that simple.

173. Id. at 610–11.
174. In addition, Ricci set up the inevitable conflict between disparate
treatment and disparate impact. See id. at 595; see also Briscoe v. City of New
Haven, 654 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2011) (analyzing a disparate impact claim by a
black firefighter who was not promoted following the Supreme Court’s order in
Ricci to reinstate the test results despite its disparate impact).
175. 551 U.S. 701, 711 (2007).
176. Id. at 747–48.
177. Id. at 748.
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II. THE FREEMAN HYPOTHESIS AND LGBT
178
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
The course of race antidiscrimination law in education
went from Brown to Parents Involved; in employment, from
Griggs to Ricci; in voting from Katzenbach v. McClung to Shelby County. Despite decades of the Court’s enforcement of antidiscrimination law, in 2015, 35 to 45% of black and Latino stu179
dents attend “intensely segregated schools;” racial minorities
180
live in segregated neighborhoods; racial discrimination per181
182
sists in the job market and in the housing market; typical
black households have “just 6% of the wealth of the typical
183
white household”; and racial minorities remain politically
178. This Part is informed by what might be described as foundational articles from the early to mid-1990s putting forward a jurisprudential vision for
addressing LGBT discrimination. See generally RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN
(OUT)LAW: SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF LAW (1992); William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1994); Katherine Franke, The
Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from
Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1995); Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet:
Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L.
REV. 915 (1989); Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 531 (1992); Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians
and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); Jane S.
Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of
Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283 (1994); Francisco Valdes, Queers,
Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,”
and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CALIF. L.
REV. 1 (1995).
179. Erman & Walton, supra note 150, at 321–22 (citation omitted).
180. See Alana Semuels, Where the White People Live: How SelfSegregation and Concentrated Affluence Became Normal in America,
ATLANTIC (Apr. 10, 2015) http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/
04/where-the-white-people-live/390153.
181. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg
More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor
Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991 (2004) (concluding employment discrimination applies equally across the employment market); Angela
Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name? On Being “Regarded as” Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal Are
White, 2005 WISC. L. REV. 1283.
182. See generally MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. &
URBAN DEV., HOUSING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST RACIAL AND ETHNIC MINORITIES 2012 (2013), http://www.huduser.gov/portal/Publications/pdf/HUD-514_
HDS2012.pdf.
183. Laura Shin, The Racial Wealth Gap: Why a Typical White Household
Has 16 Times the Wealth of a Black One, FORBES (Mar. 26, 2015, 8:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2015/03/26/the-racial-wealth-gap-why
-a-typical-white-household-has-16-times-the-wealth-of-a-black-one/
#23233dcf6c5b. These wealth differences exist for every income quintile. See
Robert S. Chang & Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Business as Usual? Brown and the
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184

powerless. With the course of race antidiscrimination law as
a backdrop, this Part examines possible trajectories for LGBT
antidiscrimination law. Trajectory 1 is, perhaps, already underway, in which LGBT antidiscrimination law is treated as
sex discrimination. Following this path would require only an
extension of the way that some LGBT discrimination is already
recognized as sex discrimination. This trajectory has the advantage of already having a doctrinal architecture but may ultimately fail because not all LGBT discrimination can be described as sex discrimination. Trajectory 2 would require the
Supreme Court to recognize LGBT persons as belonging to a
distinct suspect or quasi-suspect category. Trajectory 3 speculates that regardless of whether the Supreme Court recognizes
a new suspect or quasi-suspect category, Congress will likely
amend some of its civil rights statutes to grant formal equality,
but that once this is achieved, the Court will engage in tactics
similar to what has occurred in race antidiscrimination law. In
some ways, the Court has already begun employing some of
these tactics. These tactics will rely on narrow interpretations
of any statutory changes and upon manipulation of the public/private distinction as well as the accommodation of religion.
This Part begins, though, by discussing the course of LGBT
antidiscrimination law thus far.
A. THE COURSE OF LGBT ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW THUS FAR
Thus far, the course of LGBT antidiscrimination law has
been defined largely by the failure of law to protect the rights of
LGBT persons. William Eskridge writes that “[i]n 1956, it was
not exactly illegal to be a ‘homosexual’ in the United States, but
it was a felony to make love to anyone of the same sex, and
mere suspicion of homosexuality could cost a citizen her liveli185
hood.” Efforts to get the courts to recognize discrimination
against LGBT persons were rejected or fell on deaf ears. An example was the effort of Dr. Franklin Kameny to challenge his
dismissal from the Army and his being barred from federal employment by the Civil Service Commission following his arrest
Continuing Conundrum of Race in America, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1181, 1185–
87.
184. Cf. Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REV.
45, 75 (1996) (discussing “African-Americans’ historical political powerlessness
and its present consequences”).
185. William N. Eskridge, Jr., January 27, 1961: The Birth of Gaylegal
Equality Arguments, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 39, 39 (2001).
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186

for solicitation. After his claim was dismissed, on January 27,
1961, he filed a pro se certiorari petition to the Supreme Court
in which he argued that the employment bar “makes of the homosexual a second-rate citizen, by discriminating against him
187
The Supreme Court, without
without reasonable cause.”
188
comment, denied his petition. Then in 1986, the Court explicitly rendered constitutional laws similar to the one that led to
Dr. Kameny’s arrest when it determined that state laws crimi189
between consenting
nalizing “homosexual sodomy [sic]”
190
adults did not violate a fundamental right of homosexuals.
In the midst of federal sanctioning of anti-LGBT discrimination, a number of states and local governments began enact191
ing civil rights protections on the basis of sexual orientation.
In Colorado, in response to certain municipalities enacting protective civil rights legislation to protect against discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation, a statewide referendum
192
known as Amendment 2 was voted into law. It operated to invalidate all of these protections and to prohibit “all legislative,
executive or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect the named class, a class we shall

186. Id. at 40.
187. Id. at 41 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 32, Kameny v. Brucker, 365
U.S. 843 (1961) (No. 60-676)).
188. Id. at 42.
189. Though the Court characterized the activity this way, I think the
“[sic]” designation is appropriate.
190. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986), overruled by Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
191. See Developments in the Law—Employment Discrimination, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1568, 1625, 1627 (1996) (noting nine states and a large number
of local governments have enacted some gay civil rights protections); Schacter,
supra note 178, at 286–87 (listing the eight states that as of 1994 had
statewide protections, all of which prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and some of which extended to public accommodations, housing, education, insurance, and credit or banking).
192. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996). The Amendment read:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation. Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches
or departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute,
regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or
otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to
have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status
or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in
all respects self-executing.
COLO. CONST. art II, § 30b, quoted in Romer, 517 U.S. at 624.
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refer to as homosexual persons or gays and lesbians.” Initially challenged in state court, the Colorado Supreme Court invalidated the amendment as failing strict scrutiny, which the
court thought was required based on federal voting rights cases
and the discriminatory restructuring of governmental
194
195
decisionmaking. Justice Kennedy, in a cryptic opinion, did
not directly address the Colorado Supreme Court’s rationale
other than describing it, and then stating that it affirmed the
196
judgment of that court but on a different rationale. The opinion has come to be characterized as “rational basis with bite,”
and some commentators have placed Romer as following along
197
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno and City
198
What distinof Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.
guishes these three cases from the typical rational basis application is that, while formally under rational basis review, each
199
involved animus against a particular group. The animus requires, then, that the legislation be subject to a more searching
scrutiny.
Though the majority opinion in Romer did not mention
Bowers v. Hardwick, an absence pointedly noted by Justice
193. Romer, 517 U.S. at 624.
194. Id. at 625 (citing Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993))
(citations omitted).
195. A number of commentators over the years described the opinion and
the Court’s reasoning as cryptic. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Textualism and
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1373, 1381 (1998);
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare
Decisis Require Adherence to the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare
Decisis, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1186 (2008) (noting Romer’s “notoriously cryptic
majority opinion”); Jane S. Schacter, Unequal Inequalities? Poverty, Sexual
Orientation, and the Dynamics of Constitutional Law, 2014 UTAH. L. REV. 867,
870 (noting that Romer is “doctrinally cryptic”).
196. Romer, 517 U.S. at 625–26.
197. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
198. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). See Robert C. Farrell, Sucessful Rational Basis
Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32
IND. L. REV. 357, 409–10 (1996) (“[The Romer decision] is clearly consistent
with, and follows directly from, the Court’s earlier decision in Moreno, which
the Court cited, and Cleburne, which the Court curiously omitted.”); Kenji
Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 760 (2011) (discussing Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer).
199. Yoshino, supra note 198 (arguing that a commonality of the Romer,
Cleburne, and Moreno decisions is discrimination against a particular group).
In addition to Cleburne, there were additional cases from 1985 in which the
Court appeared to be applying a heightened rational basis test. See Gayle
Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any
Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779 (1987) (discussing four cases during the 1985
term).
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200

Scalia in dissent, some wondered if Bowers could survive the
201
equal protection logic of Romer. One appellate court went so
far as to claim, in dicta, “[o]f course Bowers will soon be
eclipsed in the area of equal protection by the Supreme Court’s
202
holding in Romer v. Evans.”
Ultimately, Bowers would be overturned, but not based on
the equal protection theory animating Romer. In Lawrence v.
Texas, the Court noted that equality of treatment and liberty
were linked and noted that “[w]hen homosexual conduct is
made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and
of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to dis203
crimination in both the public and in the private spheres.”
The Court, while finding a “tenable argument” that “Romer
provides the basis for declaring the Texas statute invalid under
204
the Equal Protection Clause,” refused to do so on that basis,
instead overturning Bowers based on a liberty interest protect205
ed by due process.
206
Romer, though, was key in United States v. Windsor, in
which the Court declared the federal Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA) to be unconstitutional. Echoing its description of Colorado’s Amendment 2 as identifying “persons by a single trait
207
and then den[ying] them protection across the board,” the
Windsor Court declared that “DOMA writes inequality into the
208
entire United States Code.” In some ways, Romer and Windsor are analogues to Croson and Adarand. Recall that in
Croson, the Court found that state and local governments could
not institute an affirmative action program without having the
appropriate factual predicate to justify the program and that
200. Romer, 517 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
201. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Challenging the Apartheid of the
Closet: Establishing Conditions for Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and
Citizenship, 1961–1981, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 817, 954 n.642 (1997) (suggesting
“the possibility that Romer provides an occasion to rethink and someday overrule Hardwick”); Kevin H. Lewis, Note, Equal Protection in the Wake of Romer
v. Evans: Implications for the Defense of Marriage Act and Other Laws, 49
HASTINGS. L.J. 175, 200 (1997) (contending “the Romer decision could be interpreted as overruling Bowers sub silento”).
202. Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 458 n.12 (7th Cir. 1996), cited in
Lewis, supra note 201.
203. 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).
204. Id. at 574–75.
205. Id. at 564.
206. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (1996).
207. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).
208. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
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state and local government actions in this context were subject
to strict scrutiny. In Adarand, the Court extended these requirements to the federal government before it can institute an
affirmative action program.
209
Though Windsor was then key to Obergefell, there is a
danger to the development contained in Windsor’s equal protection analysis: “The very aggressiveness of the Court’s approach
to the underlying equal protection question appears to exclude
congressional participation in the same antidiscrimination pro210
In the same way that racial remediation becomes
ject.”
equated with racial discrimination and subject to strict scrutiny, any remediation efforts on behalf of LGBT persons by any
governmental entity may be subject to Windsor’s heightened
examination. Romer/Windsor and Croson/Adarand are ana211
logues potentially in more ways than one.
In addition to this potential problem, it is important to
note that the constitutional path to Lawrence and Obergefell
was not smooth and direct. Along the way, there were the chal212
lenges to the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy and
challenges to private acts of discrimination under state public
213
accommodations laws. The Court’s approach to these challenges and how it likely will impact the course of LGBT antidiscrimination law is set forth below in Part II.D.
Further, current and anticipated advances in LGBT civil
rights can be examined against the backdrop of the Court’s further retrenchment in race cases. The Court may continue its
209. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
210. William D. Araiza, After the Tiers: Windsor, Congressional Power to
Enforce Equal Protection, and the Challenge of Pointillist Constitutionalism,
94 B.U. L. REV. 367, 400 (2014). Marcy Strauss describes this as the problem
of symmetry that pervades antidiscrimination law. See Marcy Strauss,
Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 168–70
(2011).
211. This point is developed more fully infra Part II.D.
212. For legal challenges post-Lawrence v. Texas, see, for example, Log
Cabin Republicans v. United States, 658 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2011); Cook v.
Gates, 528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008); Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806
(9th Cir. 2008).
213. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Hurley v.
Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995). An
interesting aspect about these two cases is that the private acts of discrimination were challenged in state courts and the plaintiffs prevailed under the respective state public accommodations laws. The Supreme Court then overturned these state supreme court decisions based on expressive First
Amendment rights of, respectively, Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574–75, and Dale, 530
U.S. at 644.
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course of granting formal equality to LGBT persons while simultaneously undoing civil rights advances that protected racial
214
minorities. Though there is an internal contradiction, this
course would serve the legitimation function for the Court because it gets to reinforce its position in society as a defender of
civil rights. This course, as well as the advocacy strategy of
LGBT organizations, would make coalition building between
215
the LGBT community and racial minorities more difficult.
It is worth noting that Romer v. Evans followed just one
year after the 1995 trilogy of cases discussed earlier that
marked the turn to a post-civil rights America. It is also worth
noting that the major advances for LGBT rights were all au216
thored by Justice Kennedy. In 1995, Justice Kennedy au217
thored Miller v. Johnson, joined Justice Rehnquist’s majority
218
opinion in Missouri v. Jenkins, and joined Justice O’Connor’s
219
opinion of the Court in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.
Justice Kennedy, the prime mover in advancing the Supreme
Court’s LGBT antidiscrimination jurisprudence, has typically
220
fallen short when it has come to race. Freeman might write
that this is consistent with his point about the legitimation
221
function that law serves.

214. Cf. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (striking down
portions of the Voting Rights Act); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133
S. Ct. 2517, 2528 (2013) (requiring a higher standard of proof for Title VII causation); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 593 (2009) (allowing defendants to
avoid disparate-impact liability if failure to take the challenged action would
have exposed the defendant to disparate-treatment liability).
215. See Devon W. Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil Rights, 47
UCLA L. REV. 1467, 1498–500 (2000) (criticizing the simultaneous invocation
of race analogies for the discrimination claim with the erasure of blacks in the
advocacy strategy against “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”); Russell K. Robinson, Marriage Equality and Postracialism, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1010, 1058 (2014) (criticizing the “like race” arguments behind marriage equality efforts which were accompanied by postracialism and an appeal to formal equality that erased
existing black subordination and undercuts efforts to redress it). This is discussed more fully infra Part II.D.
216. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2591 (2015); United States
v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2681 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 561
(2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 621 (1996).
217. 515 U.S. 900, 903 (1995).
218. 515 U.S. 70, 72 (1995).
219. 515 U.S. 200, 203 (1995).
220. Cf. Heather K. Gerken, Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal
Protection, 121 HARV. L. REV. 104, 104–05 (2007) (discussing the shift in Justice Kennedy’s race jurisprudence).
221. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 22, at 1051.
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The next three parts examine how LGBT antidiscrimination law might develop.
B. TRAJECTORY 1: LGBT DISCRIMINATION IS SEX
DISCRIMINATION
Rather than forging its own path, LGBT antidiscrimination
law might follow sex antidiscrimination law. One commentator
notes, “According to the sex discrimination argument, when
states (and private employers) discriminate against gay individuals, they do so not only because of their sexual orientation
222
but also because of their sex.” Andrew Koppelman has ad223
vanced this position consistently over the past twenty years.
The Court in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
224
Inc., accepted the argument that same-sex sexual harassment
was actionable as discrimination on the basis of sex under Title
225
VII. However, Oncale did not extend Title VII protection to
sexual orientation. Federal circuits, both before and after
Oncale, appear to agree that Title VII generally does not encompass discrimination against someone based on that person’s
226
sexual orientation. But the fact that harassment is same-sex
is sufficient to bring this within Title VII.
222. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 16, at 1104.
223. Andrew Koppelman, Beyond Levels of Scrutiny: Windsor and “Bare
Desire to Harm,” 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1045, 1053 (2014) (“All discrimination against gay people is sex discrimination for the same reason that discrimination against members of interracial couples is race discrimination.”); Andrew Koppelman, The Right to Privacy? 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 105, 105
(opening sentence: “Laws that discriminate against gay people discriminate on
the basis of sex.”); Koppelman, supra note 178, at 203 (“[D]iscrimination
against gays is sex discrimination.”).
224. 523 U.S. 75 (1998). Oncale’s recognition of sex stereotyping for samesex sexual harassment is consistent with the sex stereotyping theory relied
upon in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). But, as discussed
infra note 226, protecting against discrimination based on sex-stereotyping is
very different from protecting more generally against discrimination based on
sexual orientation.
225. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82.
226. Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc. 305 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002)
(en banc) (“[S]exual orientation is irrelevant for purposes of Title VII. It neither provides nor precludes a cause of action for sexual harassment.”); Bibby v.
Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting Title
VII does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation); Simonton v.
Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[Plaintiff has alleged that he was discriminated against not because he was a man, but because of his sexual orientation. Such a claim remains non-cognizable under Title VII.”); Higgins v. New
Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[W]e regard it
as settled law that, as drafted and authoritatively construed, Title VII does
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The EEOC and a number of lower courts have found that
certain LGBT discrimination claims are cognizable under Title
VII as sex discrimination. For example, an LGBT individual alleging sex-stereotyping has a sex discrimination claim under
227
Title VII. Similarly, discrimination against a person who is
transgender (gender identity discrimination) is discrimination
228
because of sex under Title VII. However, the federal circuits
and the Supreme Court have not extended Oncale and Price
Waterhouse to discrimination “because of sexual orientation.”
The result is that some claims that are really at their core animus based on sexual orientation succeed only if they can be
shoehorned formalistically into the “because of sex” category.
“Because of sex” sexual orientation discrimination is necessarily underinclusive.
As a pragmatic matter, this trajectory is attractive because
there is already a doctrinal structure in place, though that
same doctrinal structure creates limitations that have led some
scholars and advocates to argue for a distinct suspect or quasisuspect class.
C. TRAJECTORY 2: A DISTINCT SUSPECT OR QUASI-SUSPECT
CLASSIFICATION
Despite efforts to establish sexual orientation as a suspect
or quasi-suspect classification, the Supreme Court has thus far
not based its pro-LGBT decisions on that theory. Litigants have
not always sought recognition as a suspect or quasi-suspect
class, quite likely as a matter of litigation strategy. At times,
the argument has been carried forward by amicus briefs. For
example, though the respondents in Romer did not argue before
the U.S. Supreme Court for heightened scrutiny as a suspect or
229
quasi-suspect class, some amicus briefs did. Similarly, petinot proscribe harassment simply because of sexual orientation.”); Hopkins v.
Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 751–52 (4th Cir. 1996) (“Title VII does not
prohibit conduct based on the employee’s sexual orientation, whether homosexual, bisexual, or heterosexual. Such conduct is aimed at the employee’s
sexual orientation and not at the fact that the employee is a man or a woman.”); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989)
(“Title VII does not prohibit discrimination against homosexuals.”).
227. See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 16, at 1125–32 (discussing Title VII cases brought by sexual minorities based on sex-stereotyping).
228. See Ilona M. Turner, Comment, Sex Stereotyping Per Se: Transgender
Employees and Title VII, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 561, 562 (2007).
229. See, e.g., Brief for Asian American Legal Defense & Education Fund et
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 25–26, Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039) (“[S]uch a State constitutional provision [(Colo-
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tioners in Lawrence v. Texas did not argue suspect classifica230
tion. Instead, as in Romer, this argument was made by amici.
Perhaps emboldened by Lawrence, as well as the successes
in advancing marriage equality in the states, respondents and
the government in Windsor argued that DOMA discriminates
on the basis of sexual orientation, which triggers heightened
231
scrutiny. In Obergefell, each of the Briefs for the Petitioners
whose cases were consolidated on appeal made the argument
232
that LGBT persons were a suspect classification.
Absent a change in the ideological makeup of the Court,
the near future likely will not find sexual orientation to be a
suspect or quasi-suspect classification. In addition, tempting
though it has been in the face of discrimination to seek suspect
or quasi-suspect classification, the lessons from race antidiscrimination law demonstrate the dangers of such “protection.”
Jane Schacter discusses this more generally as a problem that
233
exists with statutory identity categories. As with race and
sex, the category that would receive protection is not a minority
or subordinated status as LGBT persons; instead, it would be
234
the neutral “sexual orientation.” Neutral categories, though
perhaps initially beneficial for the group that suffers discrimirado Amendment 2)] makes the group against which it is aimed a suspect
class, precisely as past formal exclusions from legal protection have made the
groups at which they were directed suspect or quasi-suspect . . . .”).
230. Brief of Human Rights Campaign et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 9 n.22, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102) (“In
our view, the kind of governmental and private discrimination gay people have
suffered, along with the political disempowerment such discrimination has
caused, entitles gay men and lesbians to protection as a suspect or at least
quasi-suspect class.”). This is more directly argued in Brief of the National
Lesbian & Gay Law Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 14–
28, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102).
231. See Brief for the United States on the Merits Question at 18–22, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307); Brief on the Merits
for Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor at 17–19, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No.
12-307).
232. Brief for Petitioners at 32–36, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015) (No. 14-574); Brief for Petitioners at 50–53, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(No. 14-571); Brief for Petitioners at 34–36, 39–44, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(No. 14-562); Brief for Petitioners at 38–40, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 12307).
233. Jane S. Schacter, Skepticism, Culture, and the Gay Civil Rights Debate in a Post-Civil-Rights Era, 110 HARV. L. REV. 684, 686 (1997) (reviewing
ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY (1995), and URVASHI VAID, VIRTUAL EQUALITY: THE MAINSTREAMING OF
GAY AND LESBIAN LIBERATION (1995)).
234. Id. at 705.

2142

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[100:2103

nation, lead all too quickly to reverse discrimination claims
such that the innocent whites in the race remediation context
are correlative to the innocent heterosexuals in the sexual orientation remediation context. Stated differently, formal equality only goes so far and is, in some ways, a trap.
A challenge going forward is to figure out what doctrinal
tools will best allow discrimination to be challenged and what
tools will best allow discrimination to be redressed.
D. TRAJECTORY 3: THE SEXUALITY-BLIND CONSTITUTION, THE
PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE, AND THE ACCOMMODATION OF
RELIGION
In 1997, Jerome Culp and I predicted, based on Justice
Kennedy’s invocation of Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v.
235
Ferguson, that Romer “sets up the architecture of a sexualityblind constitutionalism” similar to colorblind constitutional236
ism. In a nutshell, colorblind constitutionalism
draws a public-private distinction employing an ideological structure
that parallels the classic vision of economic liberty. Under this racial
public-private distinction, public officials exercising state powers operate according to the rule that race is not to be considered. In the
237
private sphere, however, race may be considered.

Under this mode of thinking, race remediation by public officials is racial discrimination. Remember that the “way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on
238
the basis of race.” The holding in Ricci, though involving public officials, likely extends to private employers who must proceed with extreme caution before engaging in any voluntary
employment action if intended to avoid a racially disparate outcome, because that itself becomes a race-conscious decision that
discriminates on the basis of race.

235. 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
236. Robert S. Chang & Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Nothing and Everything: Race, Romer, and (Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual) Rights, 6 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 229, 235 (1997); see also Todd M. Hughes, Making Romer Work, 33
CAL. W. L. REV. 169, 173 (1997) (“[A]n equal protection gained only for status
is not equal at all; it simply protects a name—homosexual, gay, lesbian—
without protecting any content the life attached to that name may have.”).
237. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,” 44
STAN. L. REV. 1, 8 (1991).
238. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 748 (2007) (plurality opinion); cf. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 592–93
(2009) (prohibiting racially motivated action, even where inaction leads to a
racial disparate outcome).
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Another key aspect of colorblind constitutionalism is the
creation of a private sphere within which racial discrimination
can occur with no legal recourse. Recall that in 1883 in the Civil Rights Cases, the Court rejected Congress’s authority under
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to prohibit and
provide a remedy for acts of private discrimination even though
they involved the provision of services in the area of public ac239
commodations. This did not change until 1964 when, in Heart
240
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States and Katzenbach v.
241
McClung, the Court upheld Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act. The Court re-characterized what it had previously taken to
be merely private acts of discrimination as sufficiently public
because they involved public accommodations involving inter242
state commerce.
Absent changes to federal civil rights laws, most private
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation will remain
beyond legal redress. This has been the case even in certain instances when state laws have been found to protect against discrimination against LGBT persons. Hurley v. Irish-American
243
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc. and Boy
244
Scouts of America v. Dale present stark examples of this phenomenon. In Hurley, the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB) applied to march in the 1992 St.
245
Patrick’s Day Parade in South Boston. The parade’s organizers, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council (Council),
rejected the application, but GLIB obtained a court order permitting their participation and marched in that year’s pa246
rade. The next year, GLIB applied and was again rejected by
247
the Council. GLIB sued in state court alleging violations of
the Massachusetts and U.S. Constitutions as well as Massa248
chusetts public accommodations law. The trial court rejected
239. See supra text accompanying notes 54–60.
240. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
241. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
242. McClung, 379 U.S. at 300; Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at
250–51; cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (recognizing that state
action in judicial enforcement of private racially restrictive covenants implicates the Fourteenth Amendment).
243. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
244. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
245. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 561.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
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the Council’s First Amendment argument and found that the
denial of the application was based on sexual orientation discrimination in violation of Massachusetts’ public accommoda249
tions law. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts af250
firmed. The Supreme Court, in overturning the MassachuMassachusetts court, described the conflict not as a right to be
free from sexual orientation discrimination but instead as compelled access speech, whereby GLIB was seen as trying to use
state public accommodations law in order to compel access to
the parade in a way that infringed upon the expressive First
251
Amendment rights of the parade organizers.
In Boy Scouts of America, expressive First Amendment
rights provided the constitutional rationale to override New
Jersey public accommodations law as interpreted and applied
252
by the New Jersey courts. James Dale achieved the rank of
Eagle Scout and was an adult member of the Boy Scouts of
America and an assistant scoutmaster when the Boy Scouts
learned that Dale “is an avowed homosexual and gay rights ac253
tivist” and revoked his membership. The New Jersey Supreme Court determined that the Boy Scouts was a place of
public accommodation and that the Boy Scouts violated New
Jersey public accommodations law when it revoked Dale’s
254
membership based on his homosexuality. The opening rule
statements in Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion focused on
the First Amendment’s right to freedom of association. The
opinion held that freedom of association “presupposes a free255
dom not to associate” and “[t]he forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes the group’s freedom of expressive association if the presence of that person affects in a
significant way the group’s ability to advocate public or private
256
viewpoints.” The Court went on to emphasize that the Boy
Scouts is a private, nonprofit organization and that Dale’s

249. Id. at 561–63.
250. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc. v. City of Boston,
636 N.E.2d 1293, 1301 (Mass. 1994), rev’d sub nom. Hurley, 515 U.S. 557
(1995).
251. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568–70.
252. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 646.
255. Id. at 648 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)).
256. Id.
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forced inclusion would significantly burden the Boy Scouts’ ex257
pressive desire not to promote homosexuality.
In Hurley and Boy Scouts of America, the Court draws
careful distinctions between what constitutes public as opposed
to private discrimination. Private acts of discrimination cannot
be overridden by state public accommodations laws because of
the First Amendment’s expressive rights of association. State
public accommodations laws cannot be used to compel access of
unwanted messages or forced inclusion of unwanted individuals.
The accommodation of private discrimination gains added
constitutional impetus when it is mixed with the accommoda258
tion of religion. In an ongoing set of cases in Washington
259
state, in which a flower shop, Arlene’s Flowers, refused to sell
flowers to a same-sex couple for their wedding, what will the
interplay be between the First Amendment, the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, and Washington state constitution
260
and statutes? Will Arlene’s Flowers follow a course similar to
Hurley and Boy Scouts of America? Though there are state analogues that protect the right to make and enforce contracts free
from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, 42
U.S.C. § 1981 only protects against race discrimination.
Though formal equality has been granted in the sphere of
marriage, it seems that federal LGBT antidiscrimination law
will be stunted absent amendments to many of our federal civil
257. Id. at 656.
258. See Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, and
the Purposes of Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619, 622 (2015).
259. The same-sex couple filed a civil complaint against Arlene’s Flowers in
2013. Complaint, Ingersoll v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., No. 13-2-00953-3 (Wash.
Super. Ct. Apr. 18, 2013). The State of Washington filed a civil complaint
against Arlene’s Flowers in 2013. Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief
Under the Consumer Protection Act, State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., No. 13-200871-5 (Wash. Super. Ct. May 14, 2013). Arlene’s Flowers sued Attorney
General Robert Ferguson in 2013, originally in state court but removed to federal court a few months after the initial complaint was filed in 2013. Notice of
Removal to Federal Court, Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Ferguson, No. CV-13-5094RMP (E.D. Wash. Aug. 27, 2013). Partial summary judgment in favor of the
State of Washington was granted in that state court proceeding. Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court of Washington, State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., No.
13-2-00953-3 (Wash. Super. Ct. Apr. 27, 2015).
260. In addition to the Washington case, there are a number of other cases
involving religious accommodations that will make their way through state
and federal courts. See Alex J. Luchenitser, A New Era of Inequality? Hobby
Lobby and Religious Exemptions from Anti-Discrimination Laws, 9 HARV. L &
POL’Y REV. 63, 72–73 (2015) (describing some of these cases).
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rights laws. Without such amendments, we will likely be left
261
with Herbert Wechsler’s neutral principals where courts fear
to promote one person’s associational rights over another. Recall the language from Hurley and Boy Scouts of America—the
apparatus of state power through the courts cannot be used to
compel access or force inclusion that contravenes a private par262
ty’s expressive First Amendment rights. Though jurisprudentially located within speech rights, at the heart of those opinions is the protection of a private party’s free association rights.
What the Hurley and Boy Scouts of America Court ignores is
that in deciding to not compel access or force inclusion, it is using the power of the state through its courts to empower private parties to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.
The Court becomes not quite a neutral participant in discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. It legitimizes sexual
orientation discrimination. Even if federal civil rights laws are
amended to include certain protections against sexual orientation discrimination, the doctrinal architecture already exists
263
with Hurley and Boy Scouts of America (and Hobby Lobby)
and can be borrowed from race antidiscrimination law where
formal equality is achieved yet discrimination and inequality
persist.
III. IF ALAN FREEMAN IS RIGHT, WHAT OUGHT WE TO
DO?
Freeman’s hypothesis is admittedly “descriptive and ex264
planatory, not prescriptive or normative.” If he is correct with
regard to his characterization of federal race antidiscrimination
law, and if his hypothesis extends to predict the course of federal LGBT antidiscrimination law, that it will ultimately serve
to legitimate discrimination against LGBT persons, what ought
we to do? In Antidiscrimination Law, Freeman states, “If the
federal courts are to become, as they were in the past, little

261. See text accompanying notes 44–46.
262. See Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. at 661; Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 581 (1995).
263. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). In finding
that a private, closely held corporation is a “person” and protected under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, the Court sets up religious liberty
to play a role similar to speech and associational rights in Hurley and Boy
Scouts of America to authorize private discrimination.
264. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 22, at 1050–
51.
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more than reactionary apologists for the existing order, we
265
should treat them with the contempt they deserve.”
Branding the federal courts and judges monolithically as
reactionary apologists is probably overstated. After all, when
the Supreme Court overturns a lower court as part of its project
of legitimizing racial discrimination, it is, after all, overturning
a lower court whose decision presumably might help ameliorate
racial discrimination. One might turn this around, though, and
describe the enterprise as an elaborate charade, with participants being willingly or unwillingly co-opted. From this, one
might surmise that it is naïve to put our faith in constitutionalized rights and that we ought to abandon the federal courts.
In some ways, this reprises the conversation between Critical Legal Studies (CLS) and Critical Race Theory (CRT) about
rights discourse. On the one hand, the CLS critique of rights
discourse and the radical indeterminacy of rights was taken by
266
some to mean that we ought to abandon the pursuit of rights.
267
This prompted CRT critiques of the CLS critique. In one attempt to move past the debate, Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw
noted, “The fundamental problem is that, although [CLS] Critics criticize law because it functions to legitimate existing institutional arrangements, it is precisely this legitimating function
268
that has made law receptive to certain demands in this area.”
We might describe the moment that we find ourselves in,
following Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell, as one in which
the legitimating function is precisely what advocates have been
able to deploy successfully. But we should be mindful of the
265. Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 23, at 1441.
266. See, e.g., Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals
from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 404 (1987) [hereinafter Williams, Alchemical Notes] (describing “part of CLS which rejects
rights-based theory”); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Taking Rights Aggressively: The
Perils and Promise of Critical Legal Theory for Peoples of Color, 5 L. & INEQ.
103, 120 (1987) [hereinafter Williams, Taking Rights Aggressively]
(“[E]xpositors of [CLS] . . . have . . . sweeping negative critiques of ‘liberalism,
rights and rights theory.’”). For an excellent synthesis and overview of the
CLS critique of rights, see generally Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of Rights
in Critical Legal Studies, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 178 (Wendy
Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002).
267. See, e.g., Williams, Alchemical Notes, supra note 266, at 404–05 (expressing discomfort at the CLS rejection of CRT); Williams, Taking Rights Aggressively, supra note 266, at 121–27 (describing the perils of the CLS critique).
268. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1331, 1366 (1988).
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CLS critique of rights and what Freeman criticizes as the failures of race antidiscrimination law.
But in moving forward, Crenshaw makes clear that co269
optation is a real danger and accepts at least part of the CLS
critique, warning that the civil rights community “must come to
terms with the fact that antidiscrimination discourse is fundamentally ambiguous and can accommodate conservative as well
270
as liberal views of race and equality.” She concludes by saying that “[f]or Blacks, the task at hand is to devise ways to
wage ideological and political struggle while minimizing the
271
costs of engaging in an inherently legitimating discourse.”
Though there are dangers in comparing the histories and chal272
lenges of differently situated groups, I would suggest the
same for advocates seeking to advance LGBT equality. In some
ways, advocates for LGBT equality are already working to do
this. And those seeking racial and LGBT equality cannot abandon the federal courts.
Freeman, after his corrosive characterization of the federal
courts, states simply and unsatisfactorily, “One can only hope
273
that other political institutions will be reinvigorated.” While I
agree that activity should be redirected, including to other political institutions, I would suggest that activity be redirected
toward developing state antidiscrimination law and jurisprudence. While not abandoning efforts to reform federal antidiscrimination law, we should be mindful and pragmatic to direct
our efforts to reform what we can. This was already being done
274
in the political and legal struggle for marriage equality. But
that approach tended to focus on a single issue, and national
advocacy organizations tended to view it as a state-by-state
campaign, moving on to the next state(s) when achieving suc275
cess in one.
What I suggest is a little different and in some ways is less
satisfying because states have vastly different antidiscrimination laws and jurisprudence, with some states amenable to
269. Id. at 1335.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1387.
272. See Carbado, supra note 215, at 1485 (describing comparisons between
blacks and gays as problematic); Robinson, supra note 215, at 1035–38 (examining differences between the LGBT and the black community).
273. Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 23, at 1441.
274. See Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 12, at 1247.
275. Cf. id. at 1254–55 (describing how advocacy groups in different states
approached the issue differently).
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276

change, with others, not. The already existing patchwork of
differential inequality will become intensified. But better this
than to do nothing or waste one’s efforts.
In addition, changes at the state level can lead to changes
at the federal level. The Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and the Court’s inquiry into “our society’s evolving
standards of decency” to help determine what constitutes cruel
277
and unusual punishment is instructive. For example, in Roper v. Simmons, the Court commented on its earlier decision, Atkins v. Virginia, which declared the death penalty for the mentally retarded unconstitutional. The Court considered objective
indicia in the form of legislative enactments and state practice
to conclude that there was a national consensus against execut278
ing the mentally retarded. Similarly, it found in Roper objective indicia—“the rejection of the juvenile death penalty in the
majority of States; the infrequency of its use even where it remains on the books; and the consistency in the trend toward
abolition of the practice”—sufficient to conclude “that today our
society views juveniles . . . as ‘categorically less culpable than
279
the average criminal.’” Reforms that occur at the state level
can become federalized.
There was a time during the civil rights struggle when the
federal courts were crucial to overcome the recalcitrance of
state institutions. To the extent that the federal system is recalcitrant or resistant to justice for marginalized groups and
individuals, the terrain shifts with state institutions (courts,
legislatures, administrative agencies, executives) becoming im280
portant as places to advance civil rights.
276. For example, prior to Obergefell, seventeen states made gay marriage
legal through state action, while thirteen states had banned gay marriage
through state action. Danielle Kurtzleben, Map: How Same-Sex Marriage
Laws Will Now Change Nationwide, NPR (June 26, 2015, 10:39 AM), http://
www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/06/26/417715124/map-heres-how
-same-sex-marriage-laws-will-now-change-nationwide.
277. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005).
278. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
279. Roper, 543 U.S. at 567 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316).
280. This will not be the case in all circumstances. For example, in Arizona,
with the passage of SB 1070 (anti-immigrant legislation) and HB 2281 (antiethnic studies bill), the federal courts are a crucial institution to curb the excesses of local democracy. See, e.g., Arce v. Douglas, 793 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir.
2015) (challenging a law prohibiting certain ethnic courses); Valle del Sol Inc.
v. Whiting, 732 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2013) (challenging law criminalizing
the harboring of aliens). By way of disclaimer, I am co-counsel to the student
plaintiffs who challenged HB 2281. By order of the Ninth Circuit panel, this
case is headed for trial on the students’ equal protection claims and further
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After Shelby County v. Holder, efforts could be made in
Congress to revive the unconstitutional portions of the Voting
Rights Act by developing current data rather than relying on,
as the Shelby Court described, “decades-old data relevant to
281
decades-old problems.” But while those efforts are underway,
and even alongside them, efforts could be made at the state
282
level. The California Voting Rights Act of 2001 (CVRA), writ283
ten by Joaquin Avila, presents an example of a state voting
rights act that supplements, and in some ways improves, on the
284
federal VRA. Efforts have been underway during the last
three legislative sessions in Washington to pass a Washington
285
Voting Rights Act (WVRA). Each time, the bill has progressed
286
further in the legislative process. In addition to working to
pass the WVRA, the CVRA and proposed WVRA offer models
for other states. Though it is likely that these efforts would develop only a patchwork of state VRAs, it would advance voting
rights in those states and might lead to a greater appetite to
revive and improve the federal VRA.
One barrier within law schools is that there is too much
emphasis in the law school curriculum and in the legal academy on the federal courts and the federal system, with insufficient attention paid to states. We forget sometimes that this is
a discursive process, state to federal, federal to state, and back
287
again.
The call to utilize the states as laboratories, and to achieve
justice where and when you can, brings up the point that there
is nothing inherently wrong with incrementalism as part of a
proceedings on viewpoint discrimination. Arce, 793 F.3d at 990.
281. 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2629 (2013).
282. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 14025–32 (West 2016).
283. See Marguerite Mary Leoni & Chris Skinnell, The California Voting
Rights Act, in AMERICA VOTES! A GUIDE TO MODERN ELECTION LAW AND VOTING RIGHTS 219, 221 (Benjamin E. Griffith ed., 2d ed. 2012) (crediting Joaquin
Avila as the author of CVRA).
284. See Kareem U. Crayton, Reinventing Voting Rights Preclearance, 44
IND. L. REV. 201, 239–40 (2010) (discussing CVRA as a mini-VRA that has
substantial improvements to the federal VRA).
285. Washington House Passes Voting Rights Act, COLUMBIAN (Mar. 5,
2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.columbian.com/news/2015/mar/05/Washington
-house-passes-voting-rights-act.
286. Id.
287. Cf. Daniel Lewallen, Note, Follow the Leader: Why All States Should
Remove Minimum Employee Thresholds in Antidiscrimination Laws, 47 IND.
L. REV. 817, 819 (“As enacted, Title VII followed state antidiscrimination laws
closely and, in fact, included much of the same language.”).
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political and legal advocacy strategy. This ought to be clear
from the NAACP litigation strategy to overturn Plessy v. Fer288
guson, and it ought to be clear from the marriage equality
289
legislative and litigation strategy.
A tough lesson in doing this work is that sometimes, by los290
ing, you win. The toughest lesson, though, is that sometimes,
you just lose.
CONCLUSION
On the wall in my office at work, I have a post-it that says,
“the limits of antidiscrimination law.” Every day, I look at it
and I think about how we might be able to overcome those limits. Most days, I just butt my head against that wall (and the
limits of antidiscrimination law). I imagine a conversation that
I might have with Alan Freeman if he were alive. I imagine
that he would call me an idiot or a fool, or both. But I also imagine that he might laud our efforts at the Korematsu Center
for Law and Equality. There is something that can be admired
about tilting at windmills.
In thinking about this Article’s title and whether LGBT
antidiscrimination law will follow the course of race antidiscrimination law, though the course of race antidiscrimination
law ought not to give one a lot of hope, the course of race antidiscrimination law is not yet completed. Many of us are working to shift the course of race antidiscrimination law, in theory
and in practice. It is likely that LGBT antidiscrimination law
will develop in fits and starts, sometimes one step forward and
two steps back. Though the march toward progress is not inevitable, there is no predetermined course for LGBT antidiscrimination law. Instead, it remains for us to write/right the course.

288. See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976) (chronicling black rights from Plessy through Brown v. Board of
Education).
289. Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 12 (discussing the incremental nature of marriage law in California).
290. See Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941,
945 (2011).

